

36th Lecture at the Gramsci Monument, The Bronx, NYC: 5th August 2013

WHAT IS TRUTH?

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1. In the domain in which the human subject is originally embedded, to which it belongs from the start, it is threatened by the danger of a failure to address its self, the possibility of no longer knowing who is saying 'I' while it is saying 'I', and who is intended by so saying.
2. It can be seen what a precarious instance the 'I'-saying subject is, it can be recognized especially at the moment of this demand for unity and equality with itself that is indebted already to the inkling of the impossibility of ontological closure, that is, of the impossibility of absolute knowledge.
3. Philosophy arises from this unrest of a subject whose equality with itself is anything but secure.
4. Philosophy is unrest in view of what is absolutely unsettling, which is this original loss of the self or original auto-dispersion that the subject ultimately recognizes as its truth.
5. Philosophy exists and a subject exists only in the contact of the incommensurable with the heart of equality and identity.
6. For there to be equality, inequality must be presupposed; for there to be identity, there must be non-identity or difference.
7. The thinking of German idealism confronted this cleft in identity like no other thinking before it.
8. Hegel has been accused, not always unjustly, of defusing the split in identity into determinate negation.
9. And yet, it is precisely Hegelian thinking that is opened up to the abyss of pure negativity, to the abyss within the subject, thus to an abyss that short-circuits the subject qua subject with the incommensurable.
10. The incommensurable abyss is not what the subject can reach; on the contrary, it is what it has always already reached.
11. If we equate the incommensurable with truth, then it can be asserted that there are subjects who do not care about the truth, but that there is only truth as that which no subject forgets.
12. Hegel's decisive lesson lies here, in insisting on the obstinate unforgettability of truth itself, and not in the lament that the individual subjects do not succeed in recalling it, in reactualizing it in a process of anamnestic reappropriation.
13. Truth does not have to be recalled or reactualized because it has never lost its actuality insofar as it is truth that does not forget us.
14. It is important to understand that truth as the incommensurable does not perdure in any beyond nor, at least directly, in reality.
15. The locus of truth is neither the propositional statement nor the heaven of ideas.
16. Truth here means the cleft in the structure of reality itself, that which cannot be assimilated to this structure, thus that which does not bend to the subject insofar as it dwells in the world, i.e. in reality.
17. For it bends the subject by articulating it with its elementary non-equality with itself, for the subject without subjectivity (the subject without a binding nature, without a reversible bio-teleological determination) is the subject of truth or the subject of the incommensurable insofar

as it affirms ontological non-equality with itself as the originary opening to the dimension of self-enclosure.

18. The subject is neither in possession of truth by means of true statements, nor does it dwell in the truth of being as long as truth, as this opening-up or clearing, opens up the space of obviousness of the subject's evidence.
19. Heidegger himself tried to think the truth of being along with the withdrawal, *alétheia* along with *léthe*, in such a way that unconcealedness could not be reduced to concealedness, nor concealedness to unconcealedness.
20. The dimension to which the concept of truth already refers here is the dimension of an undecidable between, the dimension of a continual conflict between presence and absence, being and withdrawal.