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RESISTANCE, REFUSAL, DESTRUCTION
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1. The resistance to the established order is coextensive with the resistance to historical time and geographical space.
2. Therefore it can be said of resistance that it traverses the mensurabilities toward the incommensurable which, following Nietzsche and Deleuze, can be called the dimension of the untimely and of becoming.
3. In resistance, the subject frees itself from the dictates of history as well as geography by referring to a domain that inscribes itself in these dictates as their implicit limit, for the domain of the untimely knows neither extension nor duration.
4. It outlines the lack of outline of a magnitude illegible in the universe of historico-geographic paradigms which the incommensurable is.
5. Blanchot has spoken of the incommensurable also as the exterior (*dehors*).
6. The category of the exterior consequently became the measureless measure of those movements of thought which, no matter how differently they have been articulated and developed, coincide in the attempt to situate the infinite within the horizon of finitude of materiality and mortality without becoming assimilated to the spectrum of measurability which is geo-historical space.
7. One could designate this geo-historical space also as the domain of the manifest, and in this sense, legible and already instituted presences.
8. The refusal would prove itself to be a refusal of presence itself, as a refusal of all that is.
9. Herein lies the ontological deployment and the ontological reach of this category: in the suspension of functional realities and presences.
10. The refusal resists all realities and presences that have asserted themselves, and continue to assert themselves, as dominant realities and powerful presences.
11. It opens itself to the non-power of a kind of non-present presence whose ontological status is too complicated to bend it to the alternative between presence and absence.
12. This opening implies a resistance which demands of the subject of refusal the endurance of an *infinite* contestation.
13. To refuse means to contest "without let-up"¹, to continually articulate a resistance against what is established, a resistance that even refuses to be anything other than resistant, merely negative.
14. The refusal introduced by Blanchot is anything other than reactive.²
15. It is affirmative and aggressive.
16. It corresponds to the law, not of unity, of 'consensus' and of 'satisfaction', but of a "necessary division and an infinite destruction".³
17. In it an echo of Benjamin's *destructive character* can be perceived.

18. Its destructive power resists any form of self-enclosure within models of coherence such as the self, the state, fatherland, the party, religion, the family, 'home'.
19. Refusal includes resistance against the phantasm of interiority and ontological stability of human subjectivity.
20. It is resistance to the 'law of the father', to any authority that tears the subject away from the exterior in order to assimilate it into some kind of interior promising it a kind of transcendental shelter.
21. It would be too simple to see in refusal nothing other than the figure of a romanticism of destruction.
22. In it something is expressed that reaches far beyond romantic self-delusion: the insistence on a freedom that would no longer be the freedom of phantasmal consciousness, of the subject completely at home in its fictions of reality.
23. To open the subject to the exterior means precisely this: to make it go through the experience of the ontological inconsistency of its world against its fictions in order to confront it with the discomfort of a freedom that makes it into a subject of unrest or, to use Nietzsche's and Deleuze's language, of *becoming*.
24. The dimension of becoming or of chaos is this space of unrest which Deleuzian thinking determines as a hyperborean zone.
25. In this zone, the subject is related to its indefiniteness, its truth as an *open subject* or as the "not finally determined animal" (Nietzsche).
26. In his lectures on *Philosophical Terminology*, Adorno insists on the connection of identity and the thinking of identity with the *principle of synthesis* and the concepts of the *whole* and the *one vis-à-vis* the dangerous uncontrollability of the non-identical, the diffuse and the many which resists its reduction to the principle of identity.
27. Everything belonging to the side of the subject has the trait of something *enduring*, of *constancy* and *self-preservation* whereas "what itself is not a subject has the character of uncertainty, of openness which evades the reduction to one".⁴
28. The subject of identity of the self hovers above the abyss of pre-synthetic multiplicity.
29. Philosophy as ontology is an idealist identification and making-identical of what is present which, in Heidegger's terminology, is the *ontic*.
30. But did not Heidegger think the ontological difference between the *ontic* and the *ontological*, between beings and being at first as an inverse constellation?
31. Beings in Heidegger's arrangement is the name for the chaotic abyss.
32. It denotes *ontic* reality which overlays this abyss (which corresponds to *being* as *nothingness* or as *withdrawal* or *concealment*) like a Deleuzian plane of consistency.
33. The difference between beings and beings would be that between abyss and (always inadequately) grounded facts, in Lacanian terminology, the crevice is between the *real* and *reality*.
34. This crevice can be defined as the difference between the universe of certainty which is the world (albeit as an incommensurable and intransparent totality of everything that *is*) and the truth (the truth of being, as Heidegger says) that postulates the exterior of the world, its essential limitedness.

35. The difference between certainty or knowledge and truth concerns the difference between established, constituted, classified, instituted and archived reality and that which resists its establishment, constitution, classification, institutionalization and archiving.
36. It concerns the incompatibility of two orders of which the first can be described as the *order of function* and the second as the *order of dysfunction*.
37. The order of function is the order of the possible and the feasible, the domain of *small politics* which is the *politics of the possible*.
38. The order of dysfunction includes what represents itself to the calculus of function as a resistance and disturbance: the impossible, the non-representable and unknowable, the measurelessness or incommensurability of life itself.
39. To it corresponds a *politics of the impossible* which would be *grand politics* that interrupts any calculus.

1 Maurice Blanchot *Politische Schriften 1958-1993*, p. 158.

2 Naturally it is nevertheless apposite to refer to the reactivity of Blanchot's political statements insofar as they (the articles collected in the *Écrits politiques*) react to current political events. They do this not only with regard to their contents, but already formally by investing their reactivity with a universal activity and affirmation transcending reactivity. Cf. Martin Saar, *Eine Frage der Politik. Zu Maurice Blanchots Écrits Politiques 1958-1993*, paper presented to the Maurice Blanchot Colloquium, Institut für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, JWGU, Frankfurt/M., 13-14 July 2007.

3 Maurice Blanchot *Politische Schriften 1958-1993*, op. cit. p. 117.

4 Theodor W. Adorno *Philosophische Terminologie*, Vol. 2, Frankfurt/M. 1974 pp. 81ff.